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Tax Deductions for Payments to Mormon 
Missionaries 
This article addresses the issue of whether payments made by par-
ents to support their child who is serving a Mormon mission should be 
deductible as charitable contributions under section 170 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Three circuits of the United States Court of Appeals 
have considered this issue and have reached three different results. Two 
of the circuits allowed the deduction/ but for different reasons, and the 
third denied the deduction. 2 This paper analyzes and evaluates the dif-
ferent approaches taken by the three circuits and concludes that the 
payments should be deductible by the parents. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Factual Setting 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon 
Church) operates a "worldwide missionary program with more than 
25,000 unsalaried missionaries proselytizing and performing other reli-
gious services in foreign countries and in the United States."3 In order 
to qualify for missionary service, candidates must demonstrate to a 
church authority that they are in compliance with strict Mormon stan-
dards regarding moral worthiness, and that they are spiritually, physi-
cally, and emotionally fit for missionary service.4 During the mission, 
missionaries engage in no other occupation and devote their entire ef-
forts to the work of the church: "Mission rules prohibit missionaries 
from dating, attending movies or plays, or engaging in various sports or 
other activities. Missionaries are required to submit weekly reports to 
their Mission President detailing the amount of time spent in church 
service and explaining their expenses for the week."5 "The church ex-
ercises almost total control over the missionary, who serves as an or-
dained minister of the church."6 
Although missionaries are encouraged to finance their missions by 
1. White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984); Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 
F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986). 
2. Davis v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988). 
3. Brinley at 1328. 
4. !d. 
5. Davis at 559. 
6. White at 1270. 
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saving sufficient funds beforehand, it is common for parents to provide 
most of the financial support for their missionary child. The policy of 
the church is to ask the missionary's parents to make monthly pay-
ments directly to their child. "The church sets the monthly payments in 
an amount it deems necessary to pay the child's minimum living ex-
penses"7 according to the area of the world in which the child is as-
signed to serve. The church does not discourage the parents from mak-
ing additional payments to their child "but regards such payments as 
personal gifts to the missionary."8 The amount of the monthly pay-
ments, as set by the church, has not been an issue and, therefore, is 
presumed to be within the bounds of reasonableness. Most of the pay-
ment is used for transportation, meals, and lodging by the missionary. 
The church states a number of reasons for its policy of requesting 
the missionary's family to pay the expenses of the mission as opposed to 
subsidizing it out of the general funds of the church. First, the church 
feels that direct contributions to missionaries foster the church doctrine 
of sacrifice and consecration. Second, the church believes that direct 
transmittal promotes frugality by missionaries because of their aware-
ness of the personal sacrifices that are being made on their behalf. 
Third, direct transmittal of contributions reduces the administrative 
and bookkeeping expenses that would otherwise be imposed on the 
church.9 
B. Applicable Law 
Section 170(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows, as a deduc-
tion, any charitable contribution made within the taxable year. 10 Para-
graph (c) of that section defines a charitable contribution as a contribu-
tion or gift "to or for the use of" a corporation organized and operated 
exclusively for religious purposes. The Federal Tax Regulations pro-
vide an additional way to qualify for a charitable deduction in section 
1.170A-1: 
(g) Contributions of services. No deduction is allowable under 
section 170 for a contribution of services. However, UNREIMBURSED 
EXPENDITURES MADE INCIDENT TO THE RENDITION OF SERVICES TO 
AN ORGANIZATION contributions to which are deductible MAY CON-
STITUTE A DEDUCTIBLE CONTRIBUTION. For example, the cost of a 
uniform without general utility which is required to be worn in per-
forming donated services is deductible. Similarly, out-of-pocket trans-
7. /d. 
8. /d. 
9. Davis at 559-60. 
I 0. l.R.C. § 170(a) (1982). 
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portation expenses necessarily incurred in performing donated services 
are deductible. REASONABLE EXPENDITURES FOR MEALS AND LODG-
ING NECESSARILY INCURRED WHILE AWAY FROM HOME IN THE 
COURSE OF PERFORMING DONATED SERVICES ALSO ARE DEDUCTIBLE. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, the phrase "while away from 
home" has the same meaning as that phrase is used for purposes of 
section 162 and the regulations thereunder. 11 
117 
The Mormon Church qualifies as a charitable organization as de-
scribed in section 170.12 Therefore, the deductibility of the payments in 
question depends upon the determination that they are either "to or for 
the use of" the Mormon Church or that they are proper out-of-pocket 
expenses incurred in the rendition of services to the Mormon Church. 
The IRS's resistance to allowing these deductions is based on the 
following facts: ( 1) the services being rendered were performed by 
someone other than the taxpayer claiming the deduction; (2) it is un-
clear whether the missionary was "away from home" for tax purposes 
in order to qualify for the meals and lodging deduction of section 
1.170A-1(g); and (3) the payments were earmarked for, or paid directly 
to, the parent's missionary child which means the church did not have 
discretionary control over the funds. 
This article focuses on these three factors and concludes the 
following: 
1. Although the parents should be entitled to claim the deduction 
as incidental out-of-pocket expenses even though they did not actually 
perform the services, the away-from-home limitation severely restricts 
the amount of the deduction; 
2. Because of the strict control exercised by the church over the 
missionary, the payments should qualify as "to or for the use of" the 
church. 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. White v. United States 
The first instance of this issue appearing in the courts was White 
v. United States, 13 in which the taxpayers claimed they were entitled to 
a charitable contribution for payments made to their missionary son. 
The government's motion for summary judgement was granted because 
the White's son was not a qualifying charitable organization, and be-
11. Treas. Reg. Section 1.170A-1 (emphasis added). 
12. Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 78, Cumulative List of Organizations 216 
(1984). 
13. 514 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Utah 1981). 
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cause the Mormon Church did not have discretion over the use of the 
funds. 14 
On appeal, however, the district court's decision was reversed, and 
the White's were permitted the deduction. The appellate court allowed 
the deduction, not as payments to or for the use of the church according 
to I.R.C. section 170, but as out-of-pocket expenses incurred in render-
ing services to a church according to Treasury Regulation section 
1.170-1 (g). 111 In allowing the deduction, the court relied on a "primary 
benefit" test which held that the deduction was allowed if the primary 
purpose of the expenditure was to benefit the church rather than the 
taxpayer. 16 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the church, not the par-
ents, was primarily served and emphasized the following facts: (a) the 
Whites were responding to the Church's request that they sponsor their 
missionary son; (b) the church set the monthly payment amount 
deemed to be the amount necessary to pay the child's minimum living 
expenses; and (c) the church exercised almost total control over the mis-
sionary and his activities. 17 
B. Brinley v. Commissioner 
In 1983, the Tax Court rejected the Brinley's claimed payments to 
their Mormon missionary son on their 1977 tax return because the son, 
not the church, had full control over the funds. 18 After the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision in White, the Tax Court reheard the case but reached 
the same result as their first decision. 19 
This decision, however, was vacated after appeal to the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 20 In general, the Brinley court agreed with the 
White court's adoption of the primary benefit test according to section 
1.170A-1 (g) and relied upon the following factors: ( 1) the nature of 
out-of-pocket expenses does not contemplate the exercise of control over 
the funds by charity;21 (2) nothing in section 1.170A-1 (g) expressly 
limits the deduction for expenditures incurred in the rendition of ser-
14. /d. at 1059. 
15. White at 1270-71. 
16. /d. at 1271-72. 
17. /d. at 1270. 
18. Brinley v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983). 
19. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932 (1984). The court rejected the Tenth Circuit's 
reliance upon § 1.170A-1 (g) because for payments to a third party rendering services to a charity, 
as opposed to expenses incurred by the taxpayer himself, the charity must have control over the 
funds. Since the Brinleys had sent the money directly to their son, the church did not exercise the 
requisite control. 
20. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986). 
21. /d. at 1332. 
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vices to the person who actually performs the services;22 and (3) the 
Fifth Circuit standard for determining the deductibility of charitable 
out-of-pocket expenses is causation23 which the court equated to the 
primary benefit test. 24 The court concluded that if the taxpayers could 
show that their payments primarily benefit the church, they would be 
deductible. 
Favorable as this analysis may seem, the Brinley court went on to 
severely restrict the potential deduction under a primary benefit test 
through the application of the "away from home" limitation. Relying 
upon an analysis of the "away from home" phrase contained in a prior 
Fifth Circuit opinion,25 the court concluded that the missionary's tax 
home was his area of mission service; therefore, he was not "away from 
home" and meals and lodging would not be deductible. 26 Since food 
and lodging account for most of the missionary's expenses, the limited 
allowance of the primary benefit test does not help the missionary's 
parents. 
Fortunately for the Brinleys, however, the court did not restrict 
the allowance of the deduction to the primary benefit test and section 
1.170A-1 (g). They also fashioned a control test for I.R.C. section 170 
and held that if either the primary benefit test or the control test is met, 
the deduction is allowed. 27 The control test did not require that the 
church have physical control over the funds; rather, it was sufficient to 
show that the church had requested that the parents/taxpayers make 
specific payments, and that the parents had responded to these re-
quests.28 Therefore, the court allowed the deduction based on the "to or 
for the use of' language of I.R.C. section 170 as well as the out-of-
pocket expenses language of section 1.170A.1 (g). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1331 (citing Orr v. United States, 343 F. 2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965)). 
24. Brinley at 1331. 
25. Michel v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 1980), states the rule: "A tax-
payer who accepts permanent or indefinite employment in a location different from that of his 
residence, however, is considered to have moved his tax home to the new location, and is therefore 
no longer considered away from home. A job may be considered indefinite or permanent if, under 
all the circumstances, it appears likely to last beyond a shore period of time. 
As is discussed later, the IRS presumes that if an assignment will last more than a year, it is 
permanent or indefinite and a deduction is not allowed. 
26. Brinley at 1333-34. 
27. Id. at 1336. 
28. Id. at 1334-35. The matching of the solicitation by the charity and the subsequent pay-
ment by the solicitor was held as distinguishing the missionary situation from the situations in 
which payments to charities were made for the benefit of individuals attending church sponsored 
schools. See Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964), and Thomason v. Commis-
sioner, 2 T.C. 441 (1943). 
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C. Davis v. United States 
After the Tenth Circuit's decision in White, the Davis' filed 
amended tax returns for 1980 and 1981 in order to claim payments to 
their missionary children during those years. When the IRS refused to 
issue a refund, the Davis' sued the Commissioner in Idaho's District 
Court.29 The Idaho court granted the government's motion for sum-
mary judgement and rejected both White's primary benefit test and 
Brinley's liberal control test. The Idaho district court rejected the pri-
mary benefit test because incidental expenses must be incurred by the 
person rendering the services. They rejected the liberal control test be-
cause the church did not have physical control of the funds. 30 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held 
the payments non-deductible. 31 The court held that the charity must 
have full control over the donated funds because "the beneficiary of a 
charitable contribution must be indefinite."82 The court agreed with the 
lower court that abuse might result from allowing the taxpayers to de-
duct expenses incurred by a third person rendering services to a char-
ity.88 Further, the court found legislative committee comments and ex-
planations that support the position that only taxpayers who actually 
perform the services are entitled to a deduction.84 
Ill. DISCUSSION 
A. Can the parents deduct the payments as out of pocket expenses 
according to Treasury Regulations § 1.170A-l(g)? 
1. The primary benefit test 
Each of the three major cases recognize the primary benefit test as 
the proper standard for determining deductibility of out-of-pocket char-
itable expenses.36 The courts, however, disagree as to its application to 
the Mormon missionary situation. Therefore, a brief discussion of the 
cases which are frequently cited by the courts should provide a helpful 
background. 
In Sampson v. Commissioner, 36 the taxpayer became actively in-
volved in a war against drugs after two of the taxpayer's four children 
29. Davis v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 468 (D. Idaho 1987). 
30. ld. at 472. 
31. Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988). 
32. ld. at 562 (citing Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1883)). 
33. ld. at 563. 
34. Id. at 564. 
35. White at 1271; Brinley at 1331; Davis at 562. 
36. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408 (1982), cited in White at 1271; and Brinley at 1332-33. 
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had destroyed their lives using hard drugs. He worked in close coopera-
tion with law-enforcement officials, expending his own money to 
purchase information on drug-dealing and to fund "buys" of heroin 
through undercover agents. The taxpayer claimed the amounts ex-
pended as a charitable contribution to the state of Kansas and his local 
county. The IRS denied his deduction, claiming (1) the funds were not 
expended exclusively for public purposes because they were used for 
the taxpayer's "private" war on drugs, and (2) the government had no 
control over the amounts spent. The Tax Court allowed the deduction 
because the taxpayer was subject to the control and supervision of the 
attorney general, and because the services he rendered primarily bene-
fited the state and community. 37 
The Sampson decision supports the missionary's parent's position. 
The court rejects the same arguments that the government makes in the 
missionary cases. Namely, that the payments were used for a personal, 
non-deductible purpose and that the church did not have control over 
the funds. 
In Babilonia v. Commissioner, 38 the parents of an Olympic figure 
skater deducted payments for skating lessons and the cost of accompa-
nying their daughter to various international competitions as contribu-
tions to the United States Olympic Team. The Ninth Circuit denied 
the deduction because the taxpayers were more likely motivated by con-
cern for their daughter and an interest in her career than by an interest 
in the Olympic Team.39 Applied to the missionary cases, this decision 
appears to favor the government's position. In both instances, parents 
are supporting their children who are performing services for a charita-
ble organization. 
Even though the Babilonia decision denies the parent's deduction, 
the Tax Court's analysis of the primary benefit test in Babilonia v. 
Commissioner, 40 supports the deduction by the missionary's parents. 
The court stated: 
Expenses which are incurred incident to the rendition of services 
to a charitable organization often have a dual character in that they 
benefit both the charity and the taxpayer. IN SUCH CASES THE PRES-
ENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL, DIRECT, PERSONAL BENEFIT TO THE TAX-
PAYER OR SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE CHARITY IS FATAL TO THE 
37. /d. at 1413. 
38. 681 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1982) cited in White at 1271; and Davis at 471. 
39. Babilonia at 679. 
40. 40 T.C.M (C.C.H.) 485 (1980). The Ninth Circuit's short opinion merely stated the 
rule and held that the Tax Court's factual determination that the expenses primarily benefited the 
taxpayer was not clearly erroneous, Therefore, the facts and analysis of this case are found in the 
Tax Court's opinion. 
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CLAIM FOR A CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTJON.41 
The Tax Court denied the deduction because they held that the bene-
fits which accrued to the olympic team were incidental to the antici-
pated personal benefits of "recognition, fame, personal satisfaction, and 
a future career in professional skating. " 42 Mormon missionaries, how-
ever, do not expect a substantial, direct, personal benefit from their two 
year service. Therefore, since there is no conflict of direct, personal, 
financial benefit, which acts to deny the deduction in Babilonia, the 
application of the primary benefit test in the Mormon missionary situa-
tion should favor the taxpayer. 
Sheffels v. United States43 involves two different taxpayers, a 
farmer and a doctor. They traveled to the Orient on a tour set up by an 
organization which promoted travel of American citizens in foreign 
countries to meet and exchange ideas with the local residents. The tax-
payers each claimed a donation to the United States government for his 
or her expenses of the trip. Both claims were denied. The court dis-
missed the farmer's claim since he and his wife spent a substantial 
amount of time in regular tourist activities.44 The court's decision was 
not as easy for the doctor. Her itinerary included numerous visits to 
hospitals, nursing homes, and schools discussing preparation of meals 
and sanitation. Her tour "left little time for shopping or individual 
sightseeing."45 Nevertheless, the court felt the primary beneficiary was 
the taxpayer and the government was served only incidentally.46 
The Sheffels decision may be distinguished from the Mormon mis-
sionary situation based on the primary benefit test. The court may have 
reasonably assumed the experience benefitted her professional career, 
or that she was more interested in visiting the Orient and interacting 
with its medical professionals than she was in serving the United States 
by improving U.S. relations with those countries. The missionaries, on 
the other hand, indicate their desire to serve the church and are as-
signed wherever the church determines they are most needed. They la-
bor for two years under the control and supervision of the church, 
solely for its benefit. 
In summary, the primary benefit test allows a deduction for 
amounts spent incident to the performance of church missionary work 
because there is no expectation of a direct, economic benefit accruing to 
41. /d. at 488 (emphasis added.) 
42. /d. 
43. 264 F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Wash. 1967) cited in White 1271; and Davis at 471. 
44. Sheffels at 88. 
45. /d. 
46. /d. 
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the missionary, and because the primary beneficiary of the proselyting 
services is the church. This is consistent with decisions of cases involv-
ing missionaries of other churches.47 The peculiar issue in the Mormon 
missionary case is the taxpayer claiming the deduction is not the mis-
sionary performing the services. 
2. Requirement that expenses incurred by persons performing ser-
vices may only be deductible by that person 
The White court present two arguments, one statutory and one 
judicial, for the allowance of the deduction even though the taxpayers' 
children perform the missionary service. The statutory argument is 
based upon I.R.C. section 262 which disallows deductions for personal, 
living, or family expenses.u Treasury Regulation section 1.262-1 (b)(S) 
specifically excludes expenses deductible under section 1.170A-1 (g) 
from the nondeductibility rule of section 262. White's reasoning is that 
section 1.262-1 (b)(S) creates a presumption that section 1.170A-1 (g) 
refers to out of pocket payments for "personal, living, or family ex-
penses" incurred in the rendition of charitable service. Therefore, per-
sonal and family expenses must be treated the same so that if personal 
expenses are deductible, family expenses must also be deductible!' 
This argument is flawed. section 262-1 (b)(S) merely recognizes an ex-
isting exception to section 262; it does not attempt to further define the 
exception. 
The judicial argument presented in White, however, is persuasive; 
it cites precedents to show that expenses incident to charitable services 
performed by another individual may still be claimed by the taxpayer 
who paid for them. In Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 110 the Second Cir-
cuit addressed large deductions for charitable contributions claimed by 
members of the well-known Rockefeller dynasty. The taxpayers shared 
the expenses of operating an organization, with a staff of over 200 em-
ployees, which was set up to provide family members with legal, ac-
counting, clerical, and investment services. The staff also provided ser-
vices to charitable organizations. The Rockefellers deducted, as 
charitable contributions, the percentage of salaries and wages paid to 
their staff members that were attributable to the charitable services 
provided to qualified organizations. 
The White court points out that the IRS did not contest the de-
47. Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973); Davenport v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 
(C.C.H.) 1585 (1975). 
48. White at 1271. 
49. ld. 
50. 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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ductibility of payments made by David Rockefeller to his employees 
who provided services to charitable organizations.111 In that instance, 
someone other than the performer of the services paid the expenses and 
was allowed the deduction without any application of the control test 
and without any resistance from the IRS. Similarly, in Archbold v. 
United States, 112 a taxpayer claimed a charitable contribution for pay-
ments to a private law firm to oppose the construction of a highway 
through land which the taxpayer had previously donated to the United 
States. The court held that the payments were deductible even though 
the services were rendered by someone other than the payer and the 
charity never had control of the funds. 
The Davis court, on the other hand, considers the White analysis 
but flatly rejects it for three reasons. First, the court is sympathetic to 
the increased burden imposed upon the IRS to verify the expense.13 
Second, the court cites an observation of the House Ways and Means 
Committee concerning section 1.170A-1 (g).114 Third, the court distin-
guishes the Rockefeller case relied on by White from the Mormon mis-
sionary situation.1111 
The Davis argument is neither conclusive, nor more persuasive 
than the White I Brinley position. At best, it is as persuasive as the other 
courts' decisions. Considering the burden to the IRS, the Brinley court 
points out that a "rigorous application of a primary benefit analysis 
precludes serious possibility of abuse" since the burden lies with the 
taxpayer to establish the deduction primarily benefitted the church.118 
The burden would not be on the IRS to disprove the deduction, rather 
on the taxpayer to establish how the funds were used and why they 
should be deductible. 
The language of the Congressional committee reports is distin-
guishable for two reasons. First, it is not law and, therefore, should be 
referred to only to establish the, intent of the legislature. Even though 
51. White at 1271. 
52. 444 F.2d 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
53. Davis at 563-64. The Davis court points out two types of potential abuse of the deduc-
tion: inflated deduction's claimed by the parents, and double deductions claimed by both the par-
ents and the child. 
54. Id. at 564. "A taxpayer may deduct, a charitable deductions, unreimbursed out-of-pocket 
expenses incurred incident to the rendition of services provided by the taxpayer to a charitable 
organization."(Citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1985) (emphasis added 
by court)). 
The court also cites the Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation of the Revenue 
Provisions of the Deficit Reduction act of 1984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1133 which states: "On-
reimbursed out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the taxpayer in rendering services to an' organiza-
tion are eligible for deduction as charitable contributions." (emphasis added by court.) 
55. ld. at 564-65. 
56. Brinley at 1332. 
115] TAX DEDUCTIONS 125 
the language appears to limit the deduction, it is not clear that the 
intent was to limit the deduction. A strict construction may be appro-
priate for a statute, but not for a committee report. Second, adopting 
such a strict reading of those reports would mean that the Rockefeller 
decision was incorrect, because Rockefeller was not the taxpayer ren-
dering the services. 
The Davis court distinguishes the Rockefeller case from the Mor-
mon missionary case because "the missionary sons were acting indepen-
dently of their parents and the parents were not rendering their service 
to the church."67 This statement is accurate but fails to consider that 
the church controls the activities of the missionaries. Therefore, in 
Rockefeller, the taxpayer pays persons under his control to provide ser-
vices to a charity while in Davis the taxpayer pays persons under the 
charity's control. There is a distinction, but it does not appear sufficient 
to allow a deduction to one taxpayer and not the other. 
3. The "away from home" limitation 
The White decision does not address the "away from home" limi-
tation, but it does cite Smith v. Commissioner68 as holding that living 
expenses of a missionary serving far from home are deductible because 
the expenditures primarily benefit the church.69 In Smith, the tax-
payer /missionary spent one month during each of the two years in 
question proselyting in Newfoundland trying to convert local people to 
his faith. The Tax Court allowed his expenses as a charitable contribu-
tion and specifically allowed his meals because he was away from 
home. The holding does not apply entirely to the Mormon missiona-
ries, however, because Smith's mission only lasted one month, which 
precludes it from the application of one year rule as shown below. 
Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-1 (g), which allows expendi-
ture incident to the performance of services, specifically states that "the 
phrase while 'away from home' has the same meaning as the phrase as 
used for purposes of section 162 and the regulations thereunder." As 
Brinley points out, the question of whether a taxpayer is "away from 
home" is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of 
each case.60 There are, however, some established guidelines to deter-
mine the taxpayer's tax home. In a normal situation, a taxpayer lives 
and works in the same vicinity, which is considered her tax home. If 
the taxpayer is required to work outside this vicinity on a temporary 
57. Davis at 565. 
58. 60 T.C. 988 (1973). 
59. White at 1271. 
60. Davis at 1333. 
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basis, she is considered away from home, and the expenses for meals 
and lodging during that time are deductible. If, however, the taxpayer 
works outside the vicinity of her residence on a permanent or indefinite 
basis, the expenses are not deductible because her tax home becomes 
her place of employment, not her residence. Although the distinction 
between temporary and permanent or indefinite is a question of fact, 
any assignment expected to last more than one year is presumed by the 
IRS to be permanent or indefinite. Although this one year presumption 
is an IRS administrative decision, it has generally been followed by the 
courts. For example, Ford v. Commissioner, 61 involved a construction 
worker who was assigned to work in a different city on a project which 
was expected to last twelve to fourteen months. The Fourth Circuit 
upheld the IRS determination that since the assignment was expected 
to last longer than a year, the taxpayer was not away from home for 
tax purposes. 
This one year rule of thumb would seem to preclude the bulk of 
the payments made to Mormon missionaries. Missionaries serve for ei-
ther eighteen months or two years in a specific geographic location. 
Although they may be moved around within that geographic boundary, 
they remain in the same general area. 
There are some exceptions to the one year rule, however, which 
are outlined in Revenue Ruling 83-82. Essentially, if the taxpayer can 
show (1) that the employment will not last more than two years, and 
(2) that the claimed tax home is the regular place of abode in a real 
and substantive sense, he may be considered away from home. Assum-
ing it is unnecessary to quibble about whether the stay is a few days 
over or under two years, the first requirement is met. Missions do not 
extend more than two years. In order for a taxpayer to meet the second 
requirement, the Revenue Ruling identifies three objective factors that 
may be required to be met: 
(1) Whether the taxpayer has used the claimed abode while per-
forming work in the vicinity thereof immediately prior to the current 
job and the taxpayer continues to maintain bona fide work contacts in 
that area during the alleged temporary employment; 
(2) Whether the taxpayer's living expenses at the claimed abode 
are duplicated because work requires the taxpayer to be away from the 
abode; and 
(3) Whether the taxpayer, a) has a family member or members 
(marital or lineal only) currently residing at the claimed abode, or b) 
continues to currently use the claimed abode frequently for the pur-
61. 227 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1955). 
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poses of the taxpayer's lodging.62 
These factors do not apply to a young missionary. It is unlikely 
that he or she has ever had bona fide work contacts, let alone maintains 
them. The living expenses are duplicated because the parents provide 
meals and lodging at their home and also for their missionary child, but 
they are not duplicated by the person away from home. Since missiona-
ries are not married, they do not have marital or lineal family members 
currently residing at the claimed abode. Based upon the application of 
the § 162 "away from home" rules, the amount of the parents' pay-
ments which represent out-of pocket expenses for meals and lodging of 
the missionary should not be allowed. 
4. Summary of the section 1.170A-l(g) analysis 
Theoretically, the parents should be entitled to deduct the pay-
ments to their missionary children even though the child performed the 
charitable services: The Mormon church is primarily benefited by the 
child's services, neither the parents nor the child receive any financial 
or tangible benefit from the payments (other than that normally associ-
ated with charitable contributions), and existing case law allows deduc-
tions for taxpayers who have made payments to third parties who per-
form services for a charity. However, since section 1.170A-1 (g) clearly 
invokes the well established "away from home" rule to incidental pay-
ments, the application of that rule, as a practical matter, would se-
verely restrict the amount that could be deducted. The parents would 
likely be better off ignoring the deduction in favor of claiming the child 
as a dependent. Therefore, in order to obtain the deduction, the parents 
must rely upon the "to or for the use of" language of I.R.C. section 
170(c). 
B. Can the parents deduct the payments as "to or for the use of' the 
church according to Internal Revenue Code section 170(c)? 
1. The primary benefit test 
Unlike the later cases, which separated the analysis of the section 
170A-1 (g) "incidental expenses" deduction from the section 170(c) "to 
or for the use of" deduction, the White court treated section 170A-1 (g) 
as a way to satisfy the "for the use of" clause of I.R.C. section 170(c).63 
The court relied exclusively upon the primary benefit test and specifi-
cally rejected the requirement that the church have control of the ex-
62. Rev. Rul. 83-82, 1983-1 C.B. 45. 
63. White, at 1270, states that the court agreed with the White's that the payments were "to 
the use of the church and relied solely on Treas. Reg. I. {70A-1 (g)." 
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penditure of the donated funds. 64 As support, it cited Rockefeller in 
which it was clear that the charities benefited by the service of Mr. 
Rockefeller's staff never had any control over the payments, and 
Archbold in which the United States government never exercised con-
trol over the funds paid to the taxpayer's attorneys to protect 
Archbold's donation of land.611 
2. The control test 
Both the Brinley and Davis courts, however, formulated control 
tests in order to determine the deductibility of the payments. In fash-
ioning a liberal control test, the Brinley court relied heavily upon a 
prior Fifth Circuit holding, Winn v. Commissioner, 66 in which a tax-
payer paid $10,000 to a church fund established for a missionary (not a 
Mormon missionary) working in Korea. The missionary was the tax-
payer's cousin and the check was channeled directly into the mission-
ary's personal account by her father who was an elder in the church. 
The $10,000 was held to be deductible. The Brinley court cited Winn 
for the propositions that a donor may earmark a contribution for a 
specific charitable purpose without losing the deduction. Also, if the 
donation was solicited by the charity, the contribution would still be 
considered "for the use of' that particular charity even though the do-
nor controlled which of the charity's activities would receive the benefit 
of the gift. 67 Applying the Winn analysis, the court held that if "the 
Brinleys can show that the church requested them to make specific pay-
ments and that they responded to those specific requests," the deduction 
would be allowed.68 
The Davis court, on the other hand, required a more stringent 
control test, holding that it was necessary for the recipient charity to 
have full control over the donated funds. The Davis control test re-
quired not only physical control by the charity, but also discretional 
control so the church, not the taxpayer, decided how the funds would 
be spent. Applying this test, the Davis court denied the deduction to the 
parents because the funds were solely within the control of the 
missionaries. 69 
As support for its strict control test, the Davis court cited an 1883 
64. /d. at 1271. 
65. /d. 
66. 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979). 
67. Brinley at 1330. 
68. /d. at 1335. 
69. Davis at 565. 
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case, Russell v. Allen, 70 in which a grantor set up a trust which would 
pay money to a charitable institution whose purpose was to provide 
money for the education of youth in St. Louis County, Missouri. The 
heirs of the grantor challenged the trust because the institution had not 
been established or incorporated before the grantor died. In describing 
what constituted a charitable trust, the Supreme Court used the follow-
ing language: "They may, and indeed must, be for the benefit of an 
indefinite number of persons; for if all the beneficiaries are personally 
designated, the trust lacks the essential element of indefiniteness, which 
is one characteristic of a legal charity."71 
Other cases with similar holdings which are frequently cited by 
courts considering the Mormon missionary issue are Winn v Commis-
sioner (discussed above);72 Tripp v. Commissioner73 (payments to a col-
lege scholarship fund that were earmarked for a particular individual 
were not deductible);74 Thomason v. Commissioner75 (denied a deduc-
tion for a donation to a qualified welfare agency to pay for the school-
ing of a specific individual);76 and Peace v. Commissioner, 77 (allowed 
deduction for funds donated to a church mission society with the stipu-
lation that specific amounts should go to each of four designated 
missionaries). 78 
3. Primary benefit v. con. rol test 
In the Mormon missionary context, the primary benefit test is 
more appropriately applied than the control test for two reasons. First, 
the "for the use of" 1<• ·1guage of I.R.C. section 170 implies that the 
charity will not contJ ol •.he payment; and second, the cases cited as sup-
port for the control test are distinguishable from the missionary case 
because of a primary benefit analysis. 
Requiring the charity to have physical and discretional control 
over donated funds in all circumstances would be equivalent to elimi-
nating the "for the use of" phrase of section 170. The phrase implies 
that the organization will not have control over, but instead will receive 
the benefits of, the payments. Commenting on the phrase "for the use 
of," the Thomason court said: 
70. 107 U.S. 165 (1883). 
71. /d. at 167. 
72. Cited in Davis at 561, Brinley at 1330; and White at 1272. 
73. 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964). 
74. Cited in White at 1271; Brinley at 1332 and Davis at 561. 
75. 2 TC. 441 (1943). 
76. Cited in Brinley at 1332; White at 1271. 
77. 43 TC. 1 (1964). 
78. Cited in Davis at 561; Brinley at 1335. 
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The phrase certainly implies that the contribution need not be made 
directly to the charitable institution .... Doubtless, if an exempt 
organization incurs liabilities in the general performance of its func-
tions and requests its donors to pay its contributions to its creditors, 
the payments will be for the use of the charity. 79 
The parents of Mormon missionaries claim that their payments are for 
the use of the church and, therefore, the church need not control the 
funds because it is primarily benefited by the payments. 
The government, and the Davis court, respond with the cases re-
ferred to above as holding that because the payments are earmarked for 
someone other than the church, the control test applies. However, the 
key distinction between the Russell, Tripp, and Thomason cases and 
the Mormon missionary situation hinges on a primary benefit analy-
sis.80 In those cases, the donated funds were used to pay for the school-
ing of designated individuals. Even though the students were attending 
a church sponsored school (Tripp), or the government was spared from 
possibly having to disburse funds for the education of the individuals 
(Russell and Thomason), the primary beneficiary was the individual 
being educated. The Mormon missionaries, on the other hand, were not 
being primarily benefited. They were being supported so they could 
serve the church without any expectation of benefit accruing to them. 
A better rule to reconcile the holdings is as follows: The initial 
question is who is primarily benefitted. If the charity is primarily and 
exclusively benefited, then the deduction should be allowed. If someone 
other than the charity is primarily benefitted, or even substantially 
benefitted, then closer scrutiny is required to ensure that the donation is 
th~ result of a genuine "detached and disinterested generosity."81 The 
control test may well be determinative in those situations but other fac-
tors may be considered depending on the situation. 
4. Summary of the section 170 analysis 
The Mormon church primarily benefited from the payments made 
by parents to their missionary children because the missionaries served 
full time for the church, their actions were controlled by the church, 
and the missionaries received no identifiable benefit from their service. 
This satisfies the detached and disinterested generosity requirement of 
Commissioner v. Duberstein and distinguishes the Mormon missionary 
79. Thomason at 444. 
80. This is not true for Peace. Although the result in Peace favors the missionary's claim, the 
analysis does not. But this analysis is consistent with the Tax Court's repeated rejection of the 
missionary's parent's dedu~tions which has been overruled by two circuits. 
81. Commissioner v Duberstein, 373 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 
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situation from the cases cited by the opponents of the deduction. In 
those cases, it was the individuals for who the payments were 
earmarked, and not the charity, that were primarily benefited. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The parents of Mormon missionaries should be entitled to a chari-
table contribution deduction to the extent their payments are within the 
amount recommended by the church. The deduction should be allowed 
according to either section 1.170A-1 (g) (as an expense that is incurred 
incidentally to the rendition of services to a qualifying charity) or Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 170(c) (as payments to or for the use of the 
church). However, the away from home limitation of section 1.170A-
1 (g) severely limits the deduction under that section. Therefore, as a 
practical matter, the parents must claim the deduction under section 
170. 
The payments qualify under section 170 because the funds pri-
marily benefit the church without bestowing any benefit on the child or 
the parents other than the pride and satisfaction that normally accom-
panies charitable service. 
K.C. Jensen 
